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Abstract: “Intelligent transmitters” taking part in distributed and networked control systems are 
considered. Such sensor systems are able to perform internal data processing, advanced functionalities 
(e.g. self-diagnoses, online reconfiguration), and to exchange information. A control system made up 
of cooperating transmitters is therefore presented, using procedures which aim to improve system 
availability and safety. Taking advantage of the information exchanged between transmitters, two 
algorithms are proposed in order to i) retain the most confident values for transmitter processing, and 
ii) perform diagnoses by result comparisons. The control system is modelled by stochastic and 
coloured Petri nets, and dependability evaluations are performed by Monte Carlo simulations. 
Availability and safety can be put in balance through the use of the proposed algorithms, and both 
criteria can be improved under some conditions, notably according to diagnostic coverage of failures. 
 
Keywords: Availability, Distributed Control Systems, Networked Control Systems, Intelligent 
Transmitters. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Continuous progress in microelectronics and micromechanics is enabling systems to integrate more 
and more abilities into smaller and smaller packages. Industrial examples are the sensor systems: 
primarily used to collect data from the physical world, they are now also able to perform internal data 
processing and other functionalities like error measurement corrections, self-adjustment, self-
diagnoses, online reconfigurations, and digital bidirectional communication [1]. These systems 
therefore appropriately refer to “transmitters” instead of “sensors,” because the latter simply pertain to 
an ability to convert quantities. The use of such transmitters with “embedded intelligence” in control 
systems then allows the spatial relocation of some operations previously performed by a central 
controller, throughout the system, forming a distributed control system (DCS). In addition, in a 
networked control system (NCS), the elements of a DCS (transmitters, actuators, controllers, etc.) are 
interconnected by a real-time communication network [2]. Network protocols and fieldbuses for 
industrial control include Controller Area Network (CAN), Profibus, Foundation Fieldbus, and 
Device-Nets [3]. A special kind of NCS involves wireless sensor networks (WSN) [4, 5], but such 
systems introduce specific issues which are outside the scope of the present paper. 
 
The defining feature of an NCS is that information (e.g. references, measurements, control signals) is 
exchanged using a network among control system elements (transmitters, actuators, controllers, etc.) 
[6, 7], by contrast with the traditional point-to-point connections. The use of a network also enables 
remote control and data transfers [7, 3]. NCS then provide many advantages, such as lower system 
complexity, reduced wiring cost, ease of maintenance, and flexibility, which bring these systems into 
several applications such as manufacturing, automobile, and aircraft [7]. On the other hand, drawbacks 
are the network-induced delays and packet dropouts, which may cause instability and affect NCS 
performance [8, 6, 9, 10, 3, 11]. The time delays come from the time sharing of the communication 
medium as well as the computation time required for communication processing [10, 9]. Packet 
dropouts are data lost while in transit through the network, typically resulting from transmission errors 
or buffer overflows [8]. Many research works therefore focus on NCS stability in order to guarantee 
constant transmission times, minimize or compensate delays, and analyse the effects on system 
performances [6, 9, 11]. 
 
In the context of industrial risk management, the most relevant NCS (or DCS) performance criteria 
relate to dependability. A generic framework on communication network dependability is provided by 
an international standard still under study [12]. An overview of the dependability constraints related to 
fieldbuses (problems of temporal coherence and traffic characteristics) can be found in the literature 
[13]. Corresponding failure modes and effects analyses (FMEA) have been also proposed [13]. 
Several other dependability analyses focus particularly on CAN protocol, for example to study the 
response time under transmission errors, using deterministic [14] or stochastic [15] models; or to study 
the effects of errors [16], using fault injection techniques. The electromagnetic interferences are the 
most common (transient) faults taken into account. Assuming both transient and permanent faults, a 
dependability evaluation of fieldbus networks has been also proposed [17], using stochastic Petri nets 
(SPN). With consideration for an application, the network behaviour under transmission errors has 
been likewise modelled by stochastic activity networks (SAN), a flexible extension of SPN, to 
evaluate NCS dependability [18]. The quantitative analyses are then performed by Monte Carlo 
simulations. Notice that, in these previous works, the focus is only given on the network, and failures 
of NCS (or DCS) elements such as transmitters and actuators are not assumed. 
 
More global dependability analyses consider both the communication network and the NCS (or DCS) 
elements. For example, scenarios leading to NCS failures are analysed taking probabilities of message 
losses into account [19]. To this end, coloured Petri nets (CPN) followed by Monte Carlo simulations 
are used. However, except for the communication, the transmitters and actuators modelled in the latter 
work cannot really be described as “intelligent”. For example, only two functions are assumed for a 
transmitter: to measure and to communicate; and the only failure mode consists in the transmission of 
an error message instead of the measurement, according to a constant probability. Similar limitations 
of the “intelligent features” of transmitters and actuators are considered in other non-Petri-based 
approaches for NCS (or DCS) dependability analyses [20, 21]. On the other hand, the reliability of 
“intelligent transmitters” has been analysed [22, 23], but without regard to networked systems, and 
relating interactions between control system elements are thus ignored. 
 
Finally, NCS (or DCS) dependability studies can be found in the literature with respect to the fault 
tolerant control (FTC) strategies [24, 25], which aim at guaranteeing the system goal to be achieved in 
spite of faults, especially in order to improve system reliability and safety [26], and for example under 
cost constraints [27]. In addition, fault diagnoses (FD) [28] aim at detecting, isolating, and estimating 
the faults, which is sometimes required by FTC strategies. Notice that Petri nets are, here again, often 
used to model fault tolerant NCS (or DCS), for example by means of SPN [29] or SAN [26]. 
 
In the present paper, “intelligent transmitters” as elements of NCS (or DCS) are analysed from a 
dependability point of view. Special features of such systems, other than the particularity of 
communicating on a network, are taken into account. These characteristic, enabled by “embedded 
intelligence,” consist in operations such as data processing, self-diagnoses and online reconfiguration. 
The contribution of this paper can therefore be appreciated as a link between reliability analyses of 
“intelligent transmitters” [22, 23], and previous works on NCS (or DCS) dependability [19]. Although 
the proposed model does not take the communication network dependability into account, some 
related works [18] can be easily integrated. The real-time communication is, however, used to make a 
network of transmitters which are allowed to implement operations by exchanging information. Such a 
control system made up of cooperating transmitters is introduced in Section 2, using procedures which 
aim at improving system availability and safety, based on two proposed algorithms. This control 
system is then modelled by stochastic and coloured Petri nets, and dependability evaluations are 
performed by Monte Carlo simulations in Section 3. Finally, the effects of the proposed algorithms on 
system availability and safety are discussed according to input parameters such as diagnostic coverage 
of failures. 
 
 
 
 
2.  CONTROL SYSTEM OF COOPERATING TRANSMITTERS ON A NETWORK 
 
2.1.  Basic Control System of Redundant Transmitters 
 
A basic control system (CS), made up of three redundant transmitters, is firstly considered. That is, all 
three of the transmitters monitor the same quantities. An overview of this CS architecture can be seen 
in Figure 1, ignoring the communication network (in purple). Each transmitter involves both 
measurand (physical quantity to be measured) and influencing factor (quantities which impact the 
measurand evaluation) monitoring, using main and auxiliary transducers, respectively. The 
measurement result, as a function of measurand and influencing factors, is then performed by a 
processing unit. In addition, self-diagnoses are available for each transmitter element (main 
transducer, auxiliary transducer and processing unit), according to a given failure diagnostic coverage. 
Finally, the measurement result is transmitted to the CS main controller, using a communication 
interface. The signal transmission can be digital (e.g. using fieldbuses or wireless communication) or 
analogue (e.g. using the main communication standard in the process industry, that is, a 4-20 mA 
analogical signal). If at least one transmitter element failure is detected by self-diagnosis, an error 
signal (e.g. for an analogical signal: over 20 mA or under 4 mA) is transmitted instead of a signal 
which represents a measurement result. If at least one transmitter element failure has occurred but no 
failure has been detected by self-diagnosis, a signal which corresponds to a normal operation of 
equipment under control (e.g. non-detection of a hazardous event) is assumed to be transmitted; that is, 
only “dangerous” failures are assumed (and thus, no spurious mode). The CS main controller is then 
able to command a safety function to be performed by actuators (outside the scope of the present 
paper), if at least the majority of its non-error received signals provide an accurate measurement result. 
That is, the voting logic of the CS main controller is 2-out-of-3 if all of the transmitters are diagnosed 
as “operating” (according to their self-diagnoses), 1-out-of-2 if two and only two transmitters are 
diagnosed as “operating,” 1-out-of-1 if one and only one transmitter is diagnosed as “operating,” and 
finally, if no transmitter is diagnosed as “operating” then the CS provides a failure information. 
 
Each transmitter therefore has three functional states: operating, if all of its elements are operating; 
detected failure, if at least one element failure has occurred and has been detected by self-diagnosis; 
and undetected failure, if at least one element failure has occurred and none has been detected by self-
diagnosis. According to these functional states of the three transmitters, the functional state of the CS 
is summarised in Figure 2. Due to the CS voting logic introduced previously, the CS is in operating 
state if at least two transmitters are in operating state, or only one is in operating state but at least 
another one is in detected failure state; the CS is in detected failure state if all three of the transmitters 
are in detected failure state; and the CS is in undetected failure state in all other cases. 
 
Figure 1: Control System Architecture 
 
Figure 2: Control System Functional States 
 
 
2.2.  From Basic Control System to Networked Control System 
 
For the present study, a communication network is assumed between the transmitters of the CS (in 
purple in Figure 1). This communication may, for example, be provided by an additional wireless 
communication interface, independently of the communication between each transmitter and the CS 
main controller. If the communication between the transmitters is not independent of the 
communication with the CS main controller, then specific issues have to be taken into account (cf. 
Section 1). This latter case is, however, not considered for the present study. The assumed 
communication module then allows the transmitters to exchange several kinds of information between 
them: transmitter identification, value of measurand (just as obtained in output from the main 
transducer), value of main transducer self-diagnosis, value of influencing factors (just as obtained in 
output from the auxiliary transducer), value of auxiliary transducer self-diagnosis, measurement result 
(obtained in output from the processing unit), value of processing unit self-diagnosis, and a diagnosis 
compilation result which is computed by the processing unit according to the three values of self-
diagnoses. The result of this diagnosis compilation determines the signal transmitted to the CS main 
controller. It is either “confident,” if the signal transmitted would represent the measurement result, or 
“not confident,” if the signal transmitted would be an error signal. 
 
A transmitter may be triggered according to two demand types. When a transmitter is triggered alone 
following a cyclic process (each transmitter is triggered in turn after a delay time), the corresponding 
demand type is denoted cyclic. When more than one transmitter is triggered at the same time, the 
corresponding demand type is denoted parallel. Because only one transmitter may use the 
communication network at once in order to prevent system instability (cf. Section 1), a transmitter is 
allowed to transmit information to the other transmitters only if it is triggered according to a cyclic 
demand type. 
 
Alternately, each transmitter therefore performs its own evaluations (values of measurand and 
influencing factors, measurement result, values of self-diagnoses, diagnosis compilation result) 
according to a cyclic demand type, and transmits all of its information to the other transmitters of the 
network which, in turn (and after a tempo time), perform their own evaluations, according to a parallel 
demand type. Moreover, each time a transmitter is triggered (either according to a cyclic or parallel 
demand type), it transmits a signal to the CS main controller (either a signal which represents a 
measurement result or an error signal, according to the diagnosis compilation result). This demand 
process may be applied to CS made up of any number of transmitters. For the present study, the CS is 
made up of three transmitters, and the corresponding demand process is reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Demand Process for the Control System made up of Three Transmitters 
 
 
2.3.  Algorithms for Cooperating Transmitters 
 
Based on two proposed algorithms, procedures are used to improve CS dependability by taking 
advantage of cooperation between transmitters. The two algorithms are denoted Backup Algorithm and 
Contrast Algorithm. The first refers to the measurand and influencing factor monitoring, performed by 
the main and auxiliary transducers. The second refers to the diagnosis compilation, performed by the 
processing unit. These algorithms are functionally independent and may or may not be used together. 
When a transmitter is triggered, it may therefore perform one or both of these algorithms. The 
algorithms use received information from other transmitters, and are based on self-diagnoses of 
transmitters’ elements in order to compare, assess, or replace values used in transmitter processing. 
Finally, these algorithms can be performed regardless of the number of transmitters on the network. 
 
The first algorithm, denoted Backup Algorithm, is used to replace a value which has been obtained for 
measurand (respectively for influencing factors) for the corresponding value from received 
information (originated from another transmitter triggered according to a cyclic demand type), if the 
latter is assumed more confident, according to the self-diagnoses of the main transducers (respectively 
the auxiliary transducers). In addition, a memorize process is used to select the assumed most 
confident values (for measurand and influencing factors), according to the self-diagnoses, among the 
last information received from other transmitters. The procedure based on Backup Algorithm is then as 
follows: 
 
Backup Algorithm – When a transmitter is triggered: 
Step 1: Perform transmitter evaluations (values of measurand and influencing factors, values of self-
diagnoses of the main and auxiliary transducers), independently of the information received 
from other transmitters. 
Step 2: Read the last information received from other transmitters. 
Step 3: Read the last information memorized by the transmitter. 
Step 4: Replace the last memorized information for the last received information, if the two 
transmitter identifications are the same, or if the values of measurand and/or influencing 
factors are assumed more confident, according to the corresponding self-diagnoses. 
Step 5: The processing unit of the transmitter performs the measurement result by using the values of 
measurand and influencing factors which are assumed the most confident, according to the 
self-diagnoses, among the transmitter evaluations and the last memorized information. 
Time Demand Signal or information transmitted 
t0 = 0 - - 
t1 = t0 cyclic demand of Transmitter 1 signal to the CS main controller 
information to the other transmitters 
t2 = t0 + tempo* parallel demand of Transmitter 2 
parallel demand of Transmitter 3 
signal to the CS main controller 
signal to the CS main controller 
t3 = t1 + delay* cyclic demand of Transmitter 2 signal to the CS main controller 
information to the other transmitters 
t4 = t2 + delay parallel demand of Transmitter 1 
parallel demand of Transmitter 3 
signal to the CS main controller 
signal to the CS main controller 
t5 = t3 + delay cyclic demand of Transmitter 3 signal to the CS main controller 
information to the other transmitters 
t6 = t4 + delay parallel demand of Transmitter 1 
parallel demand of Transmitter 2 
signal to the CS main controller 
signal to the CS main controller 
t7 = t5 + delay cyclic demand of Transmitter 1 signal to the CS main controller 
information to the other transmitters 
t8 = t6 + delay parallel demand of Transmitter 2 
parallel demand of Transmitter 3 
signal to the CS main controller 
signal to the CS main controller 
etc. etc. etc. 
*delay is the time between two transmitter triggers according to a cyclic demand, and tempo < delay 
 
Two versions of this algorithm are proposed: Backup Algorithm with Algo 1 and Backup Algorithm 
with Algo 2. Using Backup Algorithm with Algo 1, the transmitter is able to replace values which have 
been obtained for measurand or influencing factors only if the demand type is parallel (that is, when 
no information is then transmitted to the other transmitters), in order to avoid that the transmitter 
performs Backup Algorithm by using information which can itself depend on the transmitter. That is, 
Step 5 of Backup Algorithm with Algo 1 is performed only if the demand type is parallel. Using 
Backup Algorithm with Algo 2, the demand type is not considered and the previous situation is 
therefore not prevented. That is, Step 5 of Backup Algorithm with Algo 2 is always performed. 
 
The second algorithm, denoted Contrast Algorithm, is used to replace the result of the diagnosis 
compilation computed by the processing unit, for a diagnosis result obtained by comparisons of 
measurement results. When a transmitter is triggered according to a parallel demand type, it performs 
its own evaluations and then compares its measurement result to the corresponding value from 
received information (originated from another transmitter triggered according to a cyclic demand 
type). If two consecutive comparisons of measurement results, which are performed using information 
from different sending transmitters providing measurement results assumed confident according to the 
diagnosis compilation, have deduced that the measurement results are the same (respectively not the 
same), then the result of the diagnosis compilation is replaced for “confident” (respectively “not 
confident”). The procedure based on Contrast Algorithm is then as follows: 
 
Contrast Algorithm – When a transmitter is triggered: 
Step 1: Perform transmitter evaluations (measurement result, values of self-diagnoses, diagnosis 
compilation result), independently of the information received from other transmitters. 
Step 2: Read the last information received from other transmitters. 
Step 3: Compare the measurement result from the transmitter evaluations with the measurement result 
from the last received information, and memorize the transmitter identification from the last 
received information with a label which represents the match between the two measurement 
results (“positive match” if the results are the same, “negative match” otherwise), if the 
diagnosis compilation result from the last received information is “confident.” 
Step 4: Replace the diagnosis compilation result from the transmitter evaluations for “confident” 
(respectively “not confident”), if the two last memorized transmitter identifications with 
different names both have a “positive match” (respectively a “negative match”) label, and if 
the demand type is parallel. 
 
 
 
 
3.  MODELLING AND EVALUATING COOPERATING TRANSMITTERS 
 
3.1.  Stochastic and Coloured Petri Nets 
 
Petri nets are both graphical and mathematical tools. In particular, it is possible to set up state 
equations and mathematical models governing system behaviours [30]. An “ordinary” Petri net is 
made up of places (circles) and transitions (rectangles). Connections (directed arcs) may link a place to 
a transition (input arc) or vice-versa (output arc), and may be “valued” (otherwise the value is assumed 
to be one). These place-transition nets are therefore bipartite directed graphs. Places may contain 
tokens (small filled circles) which are “moved” through the enabled transitions when the latter are 
fired. A transition is enabled when each of its input places (linked to the transition by an input arc) 
contains a number of tokens equal to or greater than the corresponding input arc value. Firing an 
enabled transition then consists in two steps: first, removing, in each input place, a number of tokens 
equal to the corresponding input arc value; second, depositing, in each output place, a number of 
tokens equal to the corresponding output arc value. More details about these definitions and rules, 
examples, and Petri net properties may be found in the literature [31, 30]. 
 
Usually, the places of a Petri net represent objects or conditions, the tokens specify the values of these 
objects or conditions, and the transitions model the system activities. To allow the modelling of 
complex systems, several extended Petri nets have been developed, which notably include coloured, 
timed, and stochastic properties. In coloured Petri nets (CPN) [32], different types (colours) of tokens 
are represented in the same graph, improving the modelling facilities and clarity. More generally, 
labels (values) may be assigned to each token, and may be changed when firing transitions or staying 
in places (ageing tokens [33]). Firing policies may also depend on token labels. The time-dimension is 
introduced in timed Petri nets (TPN) by the use of sojourn times of tokens into places, and/or time 
delays for firing transitions. In stochastic Petri nets (SPN) [34], these delays are random variables. A 
flexible extension of SPN is the stochastic activity networks (SAN) [35]. When a Petri net includes 
both immediate and timed transitions, it is also denoted generalized Petri net (GPN) or generalized 
stochastic Petri net (GSPN). 
 
“Ordinary” and extended Petri nets then provide a very interesting tool for describing and studying 
information processing systems that are characterized as being concurrent, asynchronous, distributed, 
parallel, nondeterministic and/or stochastic [30]. Nevertheless, a major weakness of Petri nets is the 
complexity problem: the more general the model, the less amenable it is to analysis [30]. For example, 
under some conditions, SPN may be analysed through the use of Markov Chains [34]. For more 
complex and generalized problems, the Petri nets may be directly used for qualitative analyses, but 
quantitative analyses often require Monte Carlo simulations which can be very time-consuming. 
Comprehensive information on Petri nets may, for example, be found on the Petri nets World website 
[36]. 
 
3.2.  Modelling Framework 
 
To model the CS by taking into account the cooperation between transmitters on the network, and then 
to assess dependability criteria, the stochastic and coloured Petri nets are claimed to be an intuitive and 
powerful tool. For example, Petri nets have already been used in several related studies [17, 18, 19, 29, 
26] (cf. Section 1). While the stochastic properties are required to model random failures and 
imperfect self-diagnoses, the coloured characteristics provide a useful way to represent several kinds 
of information (e.g. values of measurand and influencing factors, measurement results, values of self-
diagnoses, diagnosis compilation result) and properties (states of transmitter’s elements, values’ 
accuracy). CPN Tools [37] has then been chosen to model the CS. It is a free computer tool developed 
by the University of Aarhus for editing, simulating and analysing coloured Petri nets [37]. Among 
other interesting characteristics, CPN Tools supports coloured and both timed and untimed Petri nets. 
Although stochastic aspects are not directly available, the declaration possibilities for variables and 
expressions allow the inclusion of these properties [32]. In addition, hierarchical Petri nets can be 
created by assigning a separate Petri Net to a transition, or by creating fusion places, which is very 
interesting to model systems made up of any number of similar elements. On the practical side, the 
user interface, graphical editor, syntax checking and contextual error messages offer facilities for use 
[39]. Finally, to perform quantitative analyses, Monte Carlo simulations are required. 
 
The stochastic and coloured Petri net for the main transducers is depicted in Figure 3. It is proposed as 
an example, and used for the modelling framework discussion. The Petri net for the auxiliary 
transducers is similar to the Petri net of Figure 3, except for some parameters and names of places, and 
it is therefore not depicted in another figure. Other Petri nets have also been designed to model the 
processing units, the whole transmitters (which hierarchically includes Petri nets for main transducers, 
auxiliary transducers and processing units, plus the communication interfaces), and to model the CS 
(which hierarchically includes three Petri nets for whole transmitters), but are not depicted in the 
present paper. The hierarchy between Petri nets is given by labels attached to the bottom left of places 
(sky blue rectangles in Figure 3). For example, the “out” label on the “SubInformation” place 
represents an output link, the “in” label on the “Demand” place represents an input link, and both are 
associated with places of another Petri net. “I/O” labels represent both input and output links, and 
other labels such as “ExDigitInfo” are assigned to places which are common to several Petri nets 
(fusion places). 
Figure 3: Stochastic and Coloured Petri Net for Main Transducers 
 
 
In Figures 3, the measure chain is in blue (the tokens represent values for measurand, and are next 
associated with values of self-diagnoses); the states of the transducer elements and self-diagnoses are 
in red (tokens represent “ok” or “failed” states, and “diagnosed” or “undiagnosed” failure); the 
(random) failure aspects are in brown (a failure occurs when the “ToFail” transition is fired, changes 
the element states, and is detected by self-diagnosis according to a failure diagnostic coverage); the 
management of the demand process is in green (tokens represent either the demand occurrences for 
elements, or the demand types); the exchanged information between transmitters and the management 
of the procedure based on Backup Algorithm (the only relevant algorithm for Figure 3) are in purple 
(tokens represent values of exchanged information, and variables used by the algorithm). 
 
The number of tokens in a non-empty place is given in an attached green filled circle, and the token 
values are given in the green rectangle close to it. The notation “1`” specifies a number of one token, 
and may be extended to any number. A place is able to contain only one kind of token defined by the 
colour type specified in capital letters, below each place. The initial number of tokens in each place is 
defined by the initial token values in lower-case, above each place. For example, the “State” place in 
Figure 3 contains one token of colour type “STATE” (which corresponds to integer numbers), and the 
token value is “100”, which corresponds to the initial token value “StateIsOk”. Other colour types may 
be “uncoloured”, for example the “InitFail” places contain tokens of type “FAILURE” which are only 
represented by the symbol “()”; may be defined by a subset, for example the “DemandType” places 
contain tokens of type “TYPEofDEMAND” which may have either “c” value (associated with cyclic 
transmitter demand type) or “p” value (associated with parallel transmitter demand type); or may be 
associated with multiple variables, for example the “Exchanged DigitInfo” places contain tokens of 
type “DIGITINFO” which groups together seven integer variables. When a colour type is timed, the 
corresponding token values are given with the symbol “@” followed by an integer value which 
represents the instant in time the token becomes available (before this instant in time, a token cannot 
be handled, that is, it cannot be used to fire transition). 
 
An input arc (from a place to a transition) specifies the number of tokens (“1`” by default) to remove 
in the input place, with an input variable which takes the value of the removed token. An output arc 
specifies the number of tokens to deposit in the output place, with an output variable which gives the 
value to the deposited token. This latter variable may be a function of input variables (these functions 
are reported in black in Figures 3). For example, the token which is deposited in the “Measurement” 
place in Figure 3 takes the value of the input variable “MeasureValue” if the input variable 
“StateValue” is equal to “StateIsOk”, and the value “MeasureIsBad” otherwise. Using bi-directed arcs 
(e.g. between the “Measurand” place and the “ToMeasure” transition), the token is unchanged in the 
input place after firing the transition, but the token value may, however, be used as input variable in 
functions for output arcs. For timed tokens, the time delay may also be changed by output arcs. For 
example, when firing the transition “ToIntiFail”, the token deposited in the “Failure” place has a time 
delay increased by a random variable which follows an exponential distribution of mean equal to 
“MTTFMainTrans”. Input parameters used for random functions are given in Table 2. Notice that a 
cold standby has been assumed for the processing units of each transmitter. That is, when the first 
failure of a processing unit occurs, there is a probability equal to “DCProcUnitStBy” that it still 
operates, for a time which follows an exponential distribution of mean equal to “MTTFProcUnitStBy.” 
 
Table 2: Input Parameters for Modelling and Evaluating the Control System 
 
Name Description Values 
MTTFMainTrans 
MTTFAuxTrans 
MTTFProcUnit 
Mean times to failure of main transducers, auxiliary 
transducers, and processing units, respectively, used for 
failure simulations according to exponential distributions 
5.000 time units 
MTTFProcUnitStBy Mean times to failure of processing units in cold standby 2.500 time units 
DCMainTrans 
DCAuxTrans 
DCProcUnit 
Failure diagnostic coverage of main transducers, auxiliary 
transducers, and processing units, respectively, that is, 
probabilities to detect a failure when it occurs 
0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 
0.75, or 1.00 
DCProcUnitStBy Probabilities of success of processing unit cold standby 0.75 
3.3.  Availability and Safety Analyses 
 
The times to failure of each transmitter element (main transducers, auxiliary transducers, processing 
units) follow exponential distributions with means specified in Table 2 (in time units). Since Monte 
Carlo simulations are used for the analyses, any other distribution can also be used. When a failure of 
an element occurs, it is detected by self-diagnosis according to a constant probability equal to the 
diagnostic coverage. The failure diagnostic coverage is assumed to be the same for each transmitter 
element, and five values are used in order to analyse the impact of this parameter on the CS 
dependability, and according to the use of the proposed algorithms. Because no maintenance action is 
assumed, the criterion used to assess the CS availability and safety is the percentage of time that the 
CS spends in each functional state during the first 10,000 time units. The availability is then computed 
as the probability (percentage of time) that the CS is in operating state, and the safety is computed as 
the probability (percentage of time) that the CS is not in undetected failure state. 
 
Six cases are analysed, according to the use (or not) of Backup Algorithm (with Algo 1 or Algo 2) 
and/or Contrast Algorithm (cf. Section 2). For each case, different failure diagnostic coverage of each 
transmitter element is used: all diagnostic coverage equal to “0.00” in the “DC00” configurations, all 
equal to “0.25” in the “DC25” configurations, and etcetera up to “1.00” in the “DC100” 
configurations. Evaluations have been performed by 500 draws of Monte Carlo simulations for each 
configuration, which provides results with an estimated 95% confidence interval at plus or minus 3% 
around the averages. The average results obtained for each configuration are reported in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Average Percentage of Time the Control System spends in each Functional State, 
during the Fist 10,000 Time Units 
 
 
4.  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
According to the results reported in Figure 4, the following remarks can be made: 
▪ Backup Algorithm globally increases the CS availability, but decreases the CS safety. 
▪ These previous gaps are increasing according to the failure diagnostic coverage, and are even 
more significant through the use of Backup Algorithm with Algo 2 than with Algo 1. 
▪ Contrast Algorithm globally increases both availability and safety when the failure diagnostic 
coverage is very low, but decreases both of them when the failure diagnostic coverage is greater. 
▪ The diagnostic coverage threshold between these previous effects of Contrast Algorithm is 
greater through the use of Backup Algorithm with Algo 2 than with Algo 1. 
 
When using Backup Algorithm, an element which is diagnosed as “failed” may be functionally 
replaced by another element which is diagnosed as “operating.” Nevertheless, an element diagnosed as 
“operating” may, in fact, be “operating,” but may also be “undetected failed.” Therefore, although 
Backup Algorithm increases availability (when an unavailable function becomes available), it also 
decreases safety (when an unavailable function, diagnosed as such, stays unavailable, but undiagnosed 
as such), and especially when the failure diagnostic coverage is low. On the other hand, when the 
failure diagnostic coverage is high, the diagnosis obtained by the use of Contrast Algorithm is less 
confident that the diagnosis compilation based on self-diagnoses. It is therefore recommended that: 
▪ The use of Backup Algorithm should depend on the balance between availability and safety. 
▪ The use of Backup Algorithm with Algo 2 instead of Algo 1 could be more justified when the 
failure diagnostic coverage is very high. 
▪ Contrast Algorithm should be used when the failure diagnostic coverage is very low, or a bit less 
low according to the use of Backup Algorithm. 
 
By using coloured and stochastic Petri nets, it has been possible to model a CS made up of “intelligent 
transmitters” and then to evaluate dependability criteria using Monte Carlo simulations. Two 
algorithms, namely Backup Algorithm and Contrast Algorithm, have been proposed in order to take 
advantage of the cooperation between transmitters to improve CS dependability. According to the 
percentage of time that the CS spends in each functional state during 10,000 time units, it has been 
shown that the CS availability and safety can be improved under some conditions (notably, according 
to the failure diagnostic coverage of transmitter elements) and, at least, can be put in balance by the 
use of the proposed algorithms. As a main conclusion, the results of the present study provide an 
indication that the new technologies inside transmitters, when appropriately used, not only provide 
practical advantages but may also be used to improve dependability criteria. 
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